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Abstract. We study the choices of two types of maximizing Public Servants over how far to carry 
privatization of industries and in what order to privatize. Two stylizations of the Public Servant's 
objectives are considered, a Niskanen-style Bureaucrat who maximizes a surplus budget subject 
to the constraint of staying in office, and a Populist who maximizes popularity/consumer welfare 
subject to the constraint of a balanced budget. Other things being equal, the Bureaucrat will priva- 
tize the sector (firms) with the least market power and the largest subsidy first. The Populist will 
adopt the same policy, if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high with 
respect to the marginal utilities. If the marginal costs are too high, however, the Populist will priva- 
tize the sector with the largest market power first. We also show that privatization is easier and 
faster in less democratic societies. 
1. Introduct ion 
Because of  the universal ly  recognized deficiencies of  s ta te-owned enterprises 
compared  to private enterprises, there is a lmost  no  controversy over the neces- 
sity to t r ans fo rm cent ra l -p lanned  economies into marke t  economies.  The con- 
t roversy lies in how to per fo rm the t rans i t ion  and  the extent of  the t rans i t ion.  
This paper  builds on  a model  of  t rans i t ion  economy in  which a Publ ic  Servent,  
i .e. ,  a poli t ician,  with different  objectives and  under  different  polit ical  inst i tu-  
t ions,  must  decide how far to carry pr ivat izat ion and  in what  order to privatize. 
Debates over pr ivat iza t ion policies among  economists  usual ly  focus on  the 
sequencing problem,  i.e.,  how to f ind the opt imal  sequence of  pr ivat iza t ion so 
as to min imize  the problems characterizing the t rans i t ion  period.  The sequence 
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suggested and practiced in these countries roughly follows the size of different 
sectors (Li, 1989; Blommesteine and Marrese, 1991): rapid privatization of 
small businesses first; establishment of a social safety net; demonopolization; 
privatization of medium state-owned enterprises; and last, privatization of 
large state-owned enterprises. 
Despite the heated discussions and various experiments over sequencing, 
there is virtually no theoretically work on sequencing. In particular, there is no 
formal model in the privatization literature that incorporates the influence of 
politics on privatization policies. We need to remember that politicians choose 
the privatization policies. Therefore, it is important to see what kind of politics 
a maximizing politician would choose under different political institutions. 
In this paper, we set up a model to test the rationale of the sequence suggest- 
ed above by economists of central planned economies and to study what kind 
of sequence a Public Servant with different objectives would choose. Some fea- 
tures of the model, including the compensation scheme, are abstracted from 
the Chinese experience. We want to see what kind of sequence is optimal for 
a Public Servant in the context of a controlled privatization process. Section 
2 introduces a two period model of a highly simplified transition economy. Sec- 
tion 3 presents the analysis of the problem of the consumer, the firm, and the 
Public Servant respectively. Two types of Public Servants are considered: one 
who maximizes the surplus budget subject to the constraint of staying in office 
- the Bureaucrat, and one who maximizes popularity/consumer welfare sub- 
ject to the constraint of a balanced budget - the Populist. Section 4 contains 
the main results of the model: other things being equal, the Bureaucrat will 
privatize the sector (firms) with the least market power 1 and the largest subsi- 
dy first. The Populist will adopt the same policy, if the marginal costs of 
products in the private sectors are not too high. Therefore, the result is quite 
robust to the specification of the politician's objectives. Also, we show that it 
can be relatively easier and faster to privatize in a less democratic society. 
Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the limitations and possible extensions of the 
model and conclude the paper. 
2. Setup and basic assumptions 
This section presents a simplified two period model of a transition economy 
that consists of I consumers, N + 1 sectors of firms, and a Public Servant. 
Consumers have different utility functions and incomes, which are ex- 
ogenously given. At time t, consumer i is rationed to a fixed amount of 
products from the public sectors at fixed prices. Because of the low prices and 
minimum amounts supplied, we assume that he buys all the quantities that are 
rationed to him. This assumption closely approximates the actual situations in 
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many central planned economies. He uses the rest of  his income to choose con- 
sumption bundles f rom the products of  the private sectors to maximize his 
utility. 
Assumption 1. Each consumer has a quasilinear utility function, ui(q0,q I . . . . .  
qN) ---- ~ti(ql . . . . .  qN) + qi0, where ql . . . .  qN are the amounts of  products 1 . . . . .  
N he consumes, and q0 is a numeraire good (P0-- 1) s.t. 
(i) U: R N + I  - -  R 1 is monotonically increasing; 
(ii) u is twice continuously differentiable, and strictly concave; 
(iii) u satisfies the following Inada conditions: 
0 0 
lim qjto - -  ui(qo . . . . .  qN) = + oo, lim qjloo a~  ui(qo . . . . .  qN) O. 
Oqj u~j 
The numeraire commodity is assumed to be already traded on the market by 
time t - 1 .  It can be thought of as some nonperishable foodstuff.  
Firms produce N distinct products and are hence divided into N sectors. 
Each sector j consists of  Lj identical firms, where Lj E [1, + oo). When Lj = 
1, sector j is a monopoly;  when Lj is large enough (approaching infinity), sec- 
tor j is competitive; when Lj is between 1 and infinity, it can have different 
degrees of  competitiveness (Tirole, 1988). This also implies that all firms within 
a sector has the same cost function. At time t -  1, k sectors are public (denoted 
by sector 1 . . . .  k), and N - k  + 1 sectors are private (denoted by sectors k + 1, 
k + 2 . . . .  , N, 0). In each period the Public Servant can choose to privatize one 
or more sectors. At time t, the Public Servant decides whether to continue 
privatizing, and which sector(s) to privatize. Without loss of generality, we 
assume sector k is picked. We can then study the characteristics of  k and the 
influence of  its privatization on the changes in consumer welfare. 
Assume that a firm lj in public sector j fulfills quota Qlj imposed by the 
Public Servant, and sells its output at a fixed price Pj, which is .below the 
market-clearing price. This assumption reflects a basic feature of  centrally 
planned economies, where prices are fixed for historical reasons and reflect 
neither cost nor market demand. 2 Therefore, the total output of  sector j is 
Qj = (~ljLj. For simplicity, assume the population in the economy is fixed. 
Therefore, we can assume that Qj and Q~j are fixed as long as sector j remains 
public, since the quota is decided by rationing over the total population. Let 
Cj(.) be the cost function of any firm lj in sector j, since they are all identical. 
The following assumption simplifies the definition of  the market power index 
defined and used in Section 3. 
Assumption 2. All firms in the same sector have the same cost function: 
Cj: R 1 -- R 1 is differentiable and monotonic, for j = 0, 1 . . . . .  N. 
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This assumption simplifies the definition of the market power index. After sec- 
tor j is privatized, firm lj's objective becomes profit maximization. Let n~j be 
the firm's profit function. It chooses the optimal output Qlj and sells it at the 
market-clearing price Pj. 
Let Pj (Q1, ' ' '  ,QN) be sector j 's inverse demand function. To ensure the ex- 
istence of a Cournot equilibrium (Novshek, 1985), we need the following as- 
sumption. 
Assumption 3. Pj(0) is twice continuously differentiable, monotonic, and sa- 
tisfies OPj(0) + Q...02pj(.0) _< 0, which requires the inverse demand function 
0Qj J OQ~ 
to be concave. 
Note that the cost function of firm lj does not change before or after privatiza- 
tion. Here we implicitly assume that technology does not change. What is 
changed is the production quantity and price, which is adjusted for the purpose 
of profit maximization. This implies that the objective functions of the firms 
change after privatization, but any efficiency gain occurs after the transition 
period. 3 
In order to simplify the structure in the later part of the model, we assume 
that none of the products of the N sectors are substitutes for each other. They 
can be either independent or complements. Another way to think about this 
assumption is to group all the substitutes in the economy in the same sector and 
simplify them into one product by using marginal rates of substitution. 
Assumption 4. 0Qi _< 0, vi ~ j. 
0Pj 
This is equivalent to saying that the cross elasticity of any two products eij = 
0qi PJ _> 0, ¥i ~ j, i, j = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n, which implies that the consumers' 
0Pj qi 
utility functions need to satisfy the following condition: 02ui(~) _< 0, ¥1 = 
0qi0q 1 
1 . . . . .  N .  
We consider two types of Public Servant. Either type knows the distribution 
of consumers' utility functions 4 and of share ownership, and the matrices of 
supply and demand elasticities of every product. The reason for this assump- 
tion is to see what would be his best policy if he has enough information. At 
any given time t, he makes three decisions - whether to continue privatizing, 
which sector to privatize, and how to compensate the consumers. In order to 
concentrate on the characteristics of the transition period, we neglect some 
other important functions of the government, such as public good provision, 
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and assume that the Public Servant's only functions are privatization and com- 
pensation. We use the parameter d to characterize the political institutions, 
where d is the percentage of consumers he needs to satisfy in order to stay in 
office. 
3. Analysis of  the model 
3.1. The firm's problem 
Public firm lj in sector j is given the quota Qlj. Assume each firm is given the 
same quota, i.e., 01j = Qkj, for all k, 1. Suppose it can fulfill the quota and sell 
its output at the fixed price Pj. Then it will provide revenue (or require sub- 
sidy) in the amount Blj, where 
Blj = Pj Qlj - Cj(Qlj)" 
After the firm is privatized, it becomes a profit maximizer. It chooses its op- 
timal output Qlj to maximize its profit. The price of product j is determined 
by the total output of  the sector, which depends on the decisions of the other 
identical firms in the same sector and the total output of  other sectors. Note 
that by Assumption 1, consumers all have quasilinear utility functions, so the 
inverse demand functions exist. We use Cournot equilibrium analysis for the 
private firms' decisions. 
Firm lj chooses the optimal output Qlj in order to 
maxQ~jPj(Q 1 . . . . .  QN)Qlj - Cj(Qlj). 
From Assumption 2, the second order condition for the above maximization 
problem is satisfied, so we only need to look at the first order condition, which 
is, 
[ OPj OPj(Q) OQh ] 
Pj+QIj [ OQj + ]~ - MCj = O. 
h~j OQ h OQj 
Let MCj be the marginal cost of  firms in sector j. Rearranging terms we get 
Pj((~)-MCj _ 1 [~ j j  1 1 1  N 1 
pj({~) Lj + h~j  --Cjh ----- ~ j  h=l~ --gjh ~ (tj 
where ~;jj is the own elasticity of demand at Qj, and gjh is the cross elasticity of 
demand between product j and product h. Since all firms of the same sector 
are identical, namely, they all have the same cost functions, the market share 
of firm lj equals the inverse of the number of firms in sector j, i.e., QIj _ 
Qj 
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- - .  Call aj firm lj's market power index, which also characterizes sector j ' s  
Lj market power. Alternatively, the above equation can be expressed as 
P . _  MCj , which will be used later. 
J 1 -- (lj 
Note that the market power index is quite general with regard to the degree 
of  competitiveness in a sector. When Lj = 1, the above formula becomes the 
monopoly pricing formula. On the other hand, if L i -- 0% the equilibrium 
converges to the competitive equilibrium (Tirole, 1988). Therefore, the market 
power index shows how much a sector can raise the price of its product above 
its marginal cost. It is inversely related to the number of firms in the sector and 
the elasticities of demand of  the product. 
3.2. The consumer's problem 
In order to study the effects of the privatization of a certain sector, say k, on 
the change of a consumer's utility, we study his maximization problem in two 
arbitrarily chosen contiguous time periods, t - 1  and t. 
At time t - l ,  sectors 1 . . . .  , k are in the public sector, fulfilling quotas; sec- 
tors O, k + 1 . . . . .  N are in the private sector, maximizing profits. Consumer 
i's rationed quantities of  products 1 through k are ~1 . . . . .  ~k, which are allo- 
cated equally to everybody in the economy. In reality, the allocations vary from 
person to person according to age, sex and other personal characteristics. Here, 
for simplicity of  analysis, and also because we can not distinguish among in- 
dividual consumers, we assume an equal allocation. 
At time t, if another sector, say, sector k, is privatized, consumer i is given 
compensation T for the price increase in product k and the price changes in the 
other private sectors. At the same time, he can buy shares in the newly priva- 
tized sector. So he chooses q[k, "" t • " qiN, q~0 in order to 
q k - l , q i k  . . . . .  qiN) + qio m a x {  q~i ]jN= 0,k U i ( ~  I . . . . .  --  t t t 
N N k - I  
s . t .  ~ ' t t = y i  + 0ij(1 t _ -- Zj)nj  -- OikS k j =~1 P jq i j  j --~k j =0 ,k  
(i) 
Pj ~'j + T-- y~, (2) 
where S k is the total revenue from the sale of sector k, "~j is the tax rate of 
sector j, and Oij is consumer i's proportion of  shares in sector j. From the 
budget constraint, consumer i's income comes from two sources: his exo- 
genously given income Yi, which can be interpreted as wage and other personal 
endowments, and his share of the after tax profit from the private sector, 
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~Nj=k 0ij(1 -- Xj)X]. His effective income, yl, with which he can choose his con- 
sumption bundle among products produced in the private sector, is total in- 
come less the expenditure on rationed products. 
Therefore, his indirect utility function is 
vi(Pt,yit ) = ¢pi(P t) + y[, 
w h e r e  Oi(P t) = [ . t i (~ l ,  " qk_ l ,q ik (P- -  t t ) , .  a t  tpt~x ~ N  t t --t  Pjqij(P ), and where • ",  " '"iiN~- J ! - -  j = k  
pt is the shorthand for the vector of  all prices at time t. Since consumer i has 
quasi-linear utility function, his indirect utility function can be written in two 
parts, with effective income separate f r o m  q)i(Pt), and the demand function is 
independent of income. 
Consumer i's indirect utility function at time t - 1  is obtained similarly. Since 
consumer i has one degree less freedom and less purchasing power at time t -  1 
compared to time t, his effective income at time t - 1  is 
N k 
y[-1 = Yi + ~ 0ij( 1 _ . ~ j ) g ~ - I  _ ~ pj qj. (3) 
j = k + l  j = l  
Then his indirect utility function at time t - 1  is 
Vi (pt-l,y[-1) = q)i (pt-1)+y[-1,  
where 
q)i ( p t - 1 )  = ] ' t i ( q l '  " " " ' qk'qik+-- t - 1  1 (p t -1) , .  . . , q [ ~ l ( p t - 1 ) )  _ 
 i 0k+l t i t  - t ,  Pj qij( P ). 
We can calculate the minimal amount of  compensation for consumer i neces- 
sary to keep him on the same indifference curve as he was before sector k is 
privatized by equating his indirect utility function at time t to that at t - 1 ,  
vi(Pt,yi t) = v i ( P t - 1 , y [ - 1 ) ,  i.e., 
qoi(Pt) + Yl = q)i(pt-1) + y [ - 1 ,  
Plugging in the definition of  y~ and y~-l from Eqn (2) and (3), and rearraning 
terms we get the individual consumer's minimal compensation, 
N 
T~ = q~i(P t-l)  - q ) i (P  t)  + ~ 0 i j (1  - "cj)(x~ - 1  - x~) + 0 i k [ S k  -- (1 - ~k)n~J - 
j = k + l  
Pkqk" 
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The first two terms, the price effect, are the change of his indirect utility due 
to price changes; the next two terms, the profit effect, show the consumer's in- 
come changes due to the changes in his after tax profit shares, where 
~N= k+ 10ij (1 --"Cj)(ff~ - 1 -  ~))is the total change in i's shares of after tax profits 
in the old private sectors as a result of privatizing sector k, and 
0ik[S k -  ( 1 -  xk)n~] is his total payment for his shares in the newly privatized 
sector less his share of the after-tax profit in this sector. Note that the profit 
effect can be either positive or negative. So are the individual consumers' 
minimal compensations. This is an important expression in the later analysis 
of the Public Servant's problem. 
Figure 1 shows the consumer's consumption before and after privatization 
in a simple two-good economy. At time t - 1 ,  sector 2 is private, while sector 
1 is public. Since ql is the rationed amount, the consumer's consumption bun- 
dle (~,q[-1) usually is not the tangency point. At time t, sector 1 is privatized. 
The price of product 1 goes up to the market clearing price P1, and the price 
of product 2 also changes. With the new price ratio and effective income, the 
consumer maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint. For some con- 
sumers, the new consumption bundle can lie on a higher indifference curve; for 
others, it can lie on a lower indifference curve. The minimal compensation, T*, 
shows the amount of transfer needed to get the consumer to the tangent point 
consumption bundle, (q[,q[), on the previous indifference curve. Note that it 
could be positive, zero or negative. 
q l  
yt/p~ 
i I I I 
_! T* gets the consumer here 
(q~, qt) u(q 1, q~,) + m 
[ I I x, " . . ,  1 
q2 
Figure 1. Consumption before and after privatization of Sector 1. 
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3.3. The Public Servant's problem 
The Public Servant is a highly simplified representation of  the government. At 
any given time t, he decides whether to continue privatizing, and, if yes, what 
sector(s) to privatize and how to compensate the consumers. Assume at time 
t, his budget comes from three sources: 
~ k - 1  
(1) Revenue and subsidies from the public sectors, j=l Bj; 
(2) Revenue from the sale of  the public sector k, Sk; 
N t (3) Taxes from the private sectors, ~j  =k'~jffj. 
It would be interesting to understand the details of  the sale process. But since 
it depends on the bargaining power of  the seller and the buyers, the future 
profitability of  the firms and a number of  other political considerations, we do 
not study these in this paper. Assume that the sale revenue has the following 
relationship with the after tax profit, S k = (1 + Sk)(1 -- Zk)n[, where ~k E R ~ 
represents the difference between the sale amount and the actual after tax 
profit  due to the bargaining power of  the buyers and seller, political considera- 
tions or other factors. 
One type of  Public Servant, the Bureaucrat, has the objective function of  
maximizing the surplus budget, i.e., total budget less total consumer compen- 
sation, subject to the constraint of  staying in office. The surplus can be used 
to build up the Bureaucracy, or on personal gratification, if he is a corrupt 
bureaucrat. 5 This objective function can be justified under a range of  circum- 
stances (Niskanen, 1971). In a society with elections, suppose that consumers/  
voters use a retrospective voting rule, i.e., they will vote for the Bureaucrat if 
they occupy the same or a higher utility curve in this period as in the last period, 
and vote against him if they are on a lower utility curve (Fiorina, 1981). Denote 
the proport ion of  votes he has to get to stay in office as d. Note that different 
democratic systems can have different d's. In a society without elections, the 
Bureaucrat also needs to satisfy a certain percentage of  consumers to be able 
to stay in office, though this d could be much lower than the one in a demo- 
cratic society. For example, suppose that consumers in a society without elec- 
tions judge the Bureaucrat 's policy in a similar retrospective way as those in 
a democratic society, and they can throw the Bureaucrat out of  the office by 
revolt or other means, if the percentage of  dissatisfied consumers exceeds 1 - 
d. Therefore, the Bureaucrat 's constraint is to satisfy at least d percent of  the 
consumers to stay in office. 
Assume that the Public Servant knows the distribution of  the consumers'  
utility functions, but does not know the utility functions of  individual con- 
sumers. In each period, therefore, he compensates everybody the same 
amount.  6 Depending on their utility functions, some consumers will be better 
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off and some will be worse off after the privatization and the compensation 
than they were before. 
To formalize the problem, let the Bureaucrat choose the sector and the level 
of consumer compensation to 
m a x  ~k j=l Bj+~=k+lXjn~+ [--Bk+Sk+Xkn~]-- I .T  (B1) 
s.t. 1_ li:T_>T~ I ->d, (S2) 
I 
where I. T is the total transfers, and the constraint means that at least d of the 
voters are content with the level of compensation offered by the government. 
For comparison with the behavior of the Bureaucrat, we model another kind 
of Public Servant, the Populist, whose objective function is to maximize 
popularity or consumer welfare, subject to a balanced budget, 
max W t = ~iv[ (P 1) 
s.t. ~ = , B j  + ~ = k +  ~xj=I + [ -  Bk + Sk + ~k~] = I .T (P2) 
In the next section, we will analyse the decisions of both types of Public Servant 
and compare their optimal behavior. 
4. Main results and discussion 
To get the final results about the Public Servant's optimal privatization policy, 
the first step is to analyse how an individual consumer's minimal compensation 
changes with the different characteristics of a sector. Since the Public Servant 
does not know each individual's utility function, but knows the distribution of 
their utility functions, the second step is to get the minimal aggregate compen- 
sation from the distribution of utility functions and the political constraint, d. 
The third step is to derive the main results about the Public Servant's optimal 
privatization policy. Then we show some results on the effects of political insti- 
tutions on the privatization process. 
4.1. Individual consumer's minimal compensation 
In order to study the Public Servant's decision, we need to know how an in- 
dividual consumer's minimal compensation changes with the characteristics of 
sector k, ~k" 
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Proposition 1. When a sector k is privatized, and consumer i's share in sector 
k is sufficiently small, then other things being constant, the minimal individual 
compensation increases with an increase in P[, and with an increase in the 
market power of sector k, and vice versa, I.e., 
0=i 
0T~ 0T~ _>0 if ~ k - ~ k  < 0 and 0ik -- a i ,  or ~k0p~ 
O P [ ' O a k  Og~ 
<0  if Ek-~p-~- k < 0 and Oik ) Ai; where 
a i = 
O(l)i(P t) OrC~ 
OP[ + ~N=k+ lOij(1--Tj) OP~ 
~k(1 - Tk) OP~ 
_> 0; 
Proof. See Appendix. 7 
Intuitively, for a small shareholder or for somebody who does not hold any 
shares in the newly privatized sector, the price effect dominates the profit effect 
- he mainly suffers from the price increase as a consumer; for a large share- 
holder, however, the profit effect dominates the price effect. 
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 1 with a simple computer simulation. The 
economy consists of 100 consumers and two goods. Consumer i's utility func- 
tion takes the form of u i = ai~/qi + (1 -ai)~f~, where the indices a i ~ [0,1] 
are generated randomly by the computer. At time t -  1, both sector 1 and 2 are 
public. We normalize P1 = Pa = qa = 1. At time t, sector 2, is privatized, but 
sector 1 is still public. Let the tax rate be 0.3, and ~2 be 0. Let sector 2 have 
a cubic cost function, C 2 = .04q32 - .gq 2 + 10q + 5. For a randomly picked con- 
sumer i, we give him different proportion of shares in sector k, and plot out 
how his minimal compensation, Ti* changes with the change in Pk, when his 
proportion of shares, 0=0,0.1,0.3,0.5. We can see that when 0=0,0.1,  his 
minimal compensation increases with an increase in Pk; when 0 = 0.3, the cut- 
point, the graph goes to the other direction from Pk=2;  when 0 = 0.5, this 
large shareholder's minimal compensation decreases with an increase in Pk" 
Note that this is only a 100-consumer economy. In a large economy, the 
threshold should be much smaller. 
234 
t';' 
T, 
0=0 
4 6 8 pklO 
i i i i 
J 0=0.1 
Ti 
0 
Ti 
o ~ 4 6 8 pklO o 
~ 6 8 lO 
i i i i = 
~ 6 ~ pkl0 
Figure 2. Minimal individual compensation. 
4.2. Minimal aggregate compensation 
Since the Public Servant does not know each individual's utility functions and 
shares, he can only make his decision f rom the aggregate behavior of  the in- 
dividual's minimal compensation.  In what follows, we derive the minimal 
aggregate compensation to all individuals. 
Recall the fo rm of  the minimal individual compensation,  T i, 
T~ = (pi(P t- l)  - q)i(P t) + 
N 
j = k + l  
Oij(l -- "lTj)(~J -1 -- ff~) 4- OikEk(1 -- '17k)7~ [ -- Pkqk"  
Note that there are two kinds of  distributions in the above expression, the in- 
direct utility function ~b(.) and the consumer 's  proport ion of shares in a private 
sector, 0.j. So in order to know the distribution of  T i, we need to know the dis- 
tributions o f  ~ i ( P  t - l )  - q~i(P t) and 0.j. 
Different individuals usuall~¢ have different utility functions. Let 5: be all 
possible functional forms of  ~b(.), and let • be the admissible set of  ~, i.e., 
C 5::6l N --, CR. We can label the indirect utility functions in • by co. Let the 
index set f~ be a subset of  the real line, i.e., co ~ f~ C R. We assume that ~b(. ,co) 
a~(. ,co) 
depends continuously on index o~, and that - -  > 0. o~ has cumulative 
0co 
distribution function M(e0). 
Let 0.j - Fj,j = k,k + 1 . . . . .  N. Let the joint distribution of  O k . . . . .  O N be 
235 
F(0)n-k-  1 where 0 E (9, and ® is the admissible set of 0.j. We employ the fol- 
lowing notation: ~" = (bk,bk+ 1 . . . . .  bN), where the bj's are the coefficients of 
the 0.j's; c = Pkqk, which is a constant because it is the expenditure on the ra- 
tioned allotment of product k. For simplicity of calculation, assume that co and 
0j are independent of each other. Suppose T~ - G(-,~), then for any given 
level of compensation T, the cumulative distribution function of Ti, i.e., the 
percentage of consumers for which T i _< T, is 
It follows that the cumulative distribution of T~ can be expressed in terms of 
the distribution of o) and 0". And this facilitates our method of solving the 
Public Servant's problem. 
In the Bureaucrat's problem, the constraint, (B2), is equivalent to G(T,13) 
_> d. Then his constrained maximization problem, (B1) and (B2), can be con- 
verted into one of  unconstrained maximization by finding the minimal T, 
Tmin, to keep him in office. Therefore, he chooses the public sector k to 
max 
k N 
Bj+ 
j= l  j = k + l  
xjx~ + [ -  Bk + Sk +'CkX~] -- I.Tmin, (B3) 
where Tmi n is the solution to G(Tmin,ff) = d. We call Tmin the minimal ag- 
gregate compensation in a transition economy. 
Figure 3 illustrate the concept of the minimal aggregate compensation by us- 
ing the same economy as in Figure 2, by calculating the minimal individual 
compensation for all 100 consumers and plotting out the cumulative distribu- 
tion function. Then for any given level of d, the proportion of consumers to 
be left not worse off  by the privatization of sector k, there is corresponding 
Tmi n, so that at least d percent of the consumers are better off. 
The following proposition characterizes the properties of Tmi n - how it 
changes with the changes in the underlying parameters. 
Proposition 2. In a large population, the minimal aggregate compensation, 
Train, increases with an increase in the market power of sector k, ~t k, i.e., 
(1) if 6k-op [ O, or 
OTmi n 
--> O, 
Oa k 
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Figure 3. Minimal aggregate compensation. 
On[ 
(2) if Ek--~k 
tion; where 
< 0 and Prob{0 k_  A] = 1, which holds in a large popula- 
A 
tg(l)(P t , ~ )  
aP k 
07t[ 
~k (1 -- "Ok) OP[ 
The intuition behind this result is quite clear. In a large population most people 
will own a very small percentage of  the total shares, a percentage that approxi- 
mates zero. It follows from Proposition 1 that for small shareholders, whose 
price effect dominates profit  effect, their minimal individual compensation in- 
creases as the price increases. Therefore,  on the aggregate level, the minimal 
aggregate compensation, Train, increases with an increase in the market power 
of  sector k, a k. 
4.3. The Public Servant's optimal behavior 
This section contains two main propositions of  the paper - the optimal choice 
of  the Bureaucrat and the Populist. 
Define the Bureaucrat 's incremental budget between period t and t - 1  as 
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IB --- S B ( t ) -  SB( t -  1) = 
N 
j = k + l  
t t-1 ~kT[~] -- I" Tmi n. "lTj (nj - "lTj ) if- [ -  Bkq- Skd- 
Therefore,  he will privatize another sector k if and only if there exists a sector 
such that IB ___ 0. 
When IB _ 0 is satisfied, the Bureaucrat will choose the public sector that 
gives him the highest surplus budget. Define the maximal budget at t ime t as 
S B *  = 
k N 
Z B j +  E 
j= l  j = k + l  
7:jn~ + [ -- B k + S k + TjTC~] -- I .  Tmi n. 
It  is obvious that maximizing SB* is equivalent to maximizing IB. We would 
like to know the characteristics of  sector k that give the Bureaucrat his maximal 
surplus budget. That  is, what kind of  sector would he like to choose? 
Proposit ion 3 (The Bureaucrat). For a Bureaucrat,  in a large population,  his 
maximal budget increases with a decrease in the market  power of  sector k; the 
incremental budget increases with an increase in the amount  of  subsidy sector 
k receives f rom the government,  i.e., 
0SB* OlB 0IB 
- _< 0, i f P r o b { 0  k___A} = 1 ; a n d - -  - 1. 
Oa k Oct k 0B k 
This proposit ion tells us that in a large population,  the Bureaucrat will gain 
most  by privatizing the public sector with the least market  power and the 
largest subsidy first, if all other characteristics of  the public sectors are the 
same. By privatizing the more competitive sector, the price increase as a result 
of  the privatization will be relatively lower. Therefore,  the Bureaucrat does not 
need to compensate the consumers as much, so he can skim off  the cream via 
minimizing the transfers he pays to maintain a certain percentage, d, of  con- 
sumers not worse of f  by his policy. 
As a comparison to the Bureaucrat,  we study the optimal policy of the 
Populist. His constrained maximization problem, (P1) and (P2), can be con- 
verted into one of  unconstrained maximization by noting that 
W t _- ~. vi(Pt,Y ~) 
1 
N 
E Bi(q 1 . . . .  -- t --t qk_l,qik(P), ,q~N(~t))_ ~ t t --t = . . .  PjQij(P ) + 
i j=k 
N k-1 
.~yi + ~ ( 1 - z j ) n ) - S k - I .  ~ p j q j + I . T  
1 j = k  j = l  
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N 
= ~  R i ( ~ l " "  --  t - t  ", qk-l,qik( P ) . . . . .  q[N(Pt)) -- ~ 
i i=k 
Cj(Qj) + 2,  
k-1 ~ k - 1  -- ~. 
where 2 = ~iYi + ~ j  = 1 Bj - j = ! pj  t~j is a c o n s t a n t .  Therefore, h i s  u n c o n -  
s t r a i n e d  maximization problem is 
N 
max X; ~ti(~ 1 . . . .  - t - t  , qk-~,qik( P ) . . . . .  q[N(Pt)) -- E 
i j = k  
Ci(Qj) (P3) 
Define the incremental welfare between period t and t - 1  as 
IW = .~ [vi(Pt,y~)-vi(Pt-l,y~-l)l. 
I 
Therefore, he will privatize another sector k if and only if  there exists a sector 
such that IW _> 0. 
Proposition 4 (The Populist). For a Populist, the maximal social welfare in- 
creases with a decrease in the market power of  sector k, if the sum of  weighted 
marginal utilities for products in the private sectors is greater than or equal to 
their marginal costs, and vice versa; while the incremental social welfare in- 
creases with an increase in subsidy sector k receives when it belongs to the 
public sector. 
0Wt/0ct k_< 0, 
0Wt/0ct k > 0, 
0IW 
- -  1 ~  
0B k 
if ~ ~N ¢ 0qij 
i j = k ' - -  OP-~ ) ( ~ t i j - M C j ) - 0  
otherwise; 
where ~ij is consumer i's marginal utility with respect to product j. 
The above proposition shows that holding the other characteristics of  the firms 
in the public sector the same, if the marginal costs of products in the private 
sectors are not too high relative to marginal utilities, a Populist will privatize 
the public sector with the least market power and the largest subsidy first. In- 
tuitively, when the marginal costs of products in the private sector are not too 
high, the dominating effect in the social welfare function is the sum of  in- 
dividuals' indirect utility functions (see (P3)), whose magnitude increases with 
a decrease of  the market power of the newly privatized sector due to the price 
effect. In this case, privatizing the more competitive sector is the socially most 
efficient way of privatization. When the marginal costs of  products in the 
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private sectors are too high with respect to marginal utilities, the dominating 
effect in the social welfare function is the sum of costs in the private sectors. 
In this case the Populist will privatize the most monopolistic sector first, since 
the increase in its prices causes a decrease in the demand of other products, s 
which causes a decrease in the total cost of production, and hence an increase 
in the total social welfare. This seemingly perverse result makes sense because 
the cost of production affects the profit of private firms, all of which goes to 
the consumers either as profit shares or as compensations from the profit tax 
to the state, therefore affect the total social welfare. 
From the above two propositions, the optimal privatization policy is quite 
robust to the specification of the politician's objectives. Under ordinary situa- 
tions, exploiting the more nearly competitive pricing is a faster route to effi- 
ciency gain for either type: the one who wants to give adequate capture of effi- 
ciency gains to enough citizens at lowest possible rent transfer, and the one who 
wants to maximize the social welfare when the marginal costs in the existing 
private sectors are not too high. An interesting but probably unusual case arises 
when the marginal costs in the private sectors are too high relative to the margi- 
nal utilities, when the Populist gains more by privatizing the monopolistic sec- 
tors first. 
4.4. Political institutions and the optimal policy 
The above analysis on the Bureaucrat holds the political institution, the percen- 
tage of support needed to retain power, constant. It is interesting to know how 
the privatization processes differ under different political institutions. The fol- 
lowing proposition will help us understand how the characteristics of political 
institutions might affect the Bureaucrat's behavior. 
Proposition 5. The maximal surplus budget increases with a decrease in the 
OSB* 
threshold of the satisfaction level, d, i.e., - ~  < 0. 
This proposition shows that in an economy with a smaller d, i.e., a less 
democratic society, the Bureaucrat actually benefits more from the privatiza- 
tion process. If the surplus budget becomes his personal property, he becomes 
richer consequently. If it is used to ease the operation of the Bureaucracy or 
privatization process, it could be relatively easier and faster to privatize in a 
less democratic society. 
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5. Summary and extensions 
From the analysis of the strategies of  Public Servants with different objective 
functions, we can see that the comparative statics results are very similar under 
ordinary situations. Among the public sectors with all other characteristics the 
same, each will choose to privatize the sector with the least market power and 
the largest subsidy from the state. Intuitively speaking, this is the "cheapest"  
way to privatize f rom either Public Servant's point of  view. 
This is a two-period static model. We assumed that the number of  firms re- 
mained the same. Our results suggest that from the Public Servant's point of  
view he should encourage measures that can drive down the market power of 
a sector. An important issue about transition is whether or not large enterprises 
should be broken up before privatization. Since demonopolization will drive 
down the market power of  that sector, the answer is positive. Another impor- 
tant issue is entry. If we allow entry into the model, it also drives down the 
1 1 
market power of  any sector, aj =7--  E h -  . 
~j  8jh 
Going back to the sequencing policy discussed in the introduction, we can 
see that the size of  a sector is not the only factor that should be taken into con- 
sideration in the Public Servant's optimal policy. Other important factors, 
such as the subsidy a sector gets, the elasticity of demand of  the product, and 
the competitiveness of  a sector (the latter two are included in the concept of  
the market power index) should all be taken into consideration. 
Another assumption is that all goods are non-substitutes to each other. Sub- 
stitutes are grouped in the same sector. A more realistic approach would do 
away with this assumption. Such a model would be more complicated, and we 
are not sure how the result would change. In our model, the wage income of 
the consumers and the cost functions of firms are taken as exogenously given. 
Future work should be done to make these factors endogenous within the 
economy. Some preliminary thinking suggests that the privatization of  a sector 
in the economy would lead to a total change in the supply and demand of  labor, 
and hence the change in wage income. Therefore, for the consumers in a transi- 
tion economy, both the compensation from the government and the change in 
their wage income will be the decisive factor in coping with price increases. 
Though not exactly a model of the Chinese reform, it sheds some lights on 
the sequence of reform policies in price liberalization and partial privatization 
in China over the past decade (Wang and Chern, 1992). Though the political 
and economic situations in Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet republics are differ- 
ent from China 9, some of  the schemes and sequencing considerations from the 
Chinese experience can still provide some practical lessons on the likely success 
and failure of  transition toward a market economy. 
Although we have focused on the question of the order in which sectors 
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w o u l d  b e  p r i v a t i z e d ,  a n u m b e r  o f  n o r m a t i v e  a n a l y s e s  o f  p r i v a t i z a t i o n  r i s k  
l i m i t e d  r e l e v a n c e  i f  t h e y  d o  n o t  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  e c o n o m i c  f a c t o r s  
i n t r o d u c e d  in  t h i s  p a p e r .  
Notes  
1. This concept is introduced later. It basically captures the competitiveness of the sector and the 
elasticity of the product. The higher the market power of a sector, the more it can raise the 
price above marginal cost. 
2. There are cases when there is no demand for the output of certain goods at the state-set prices, 
mostly in the production sector. In these cases, privatization may actually decrease the prices 
or change the products to something demanded by the market. Since there is little ambiguity 
in the privatization of these sectors and consumers do not need to be compensated for their 
privatization, we assume that they are privatized already and hence do not focus our attention 
on these cases. 
3. Here we do not want to make ad hoc assumptions about the effects of privatization on cost, 
efficiency, or quality. 
4. But he does not know the exact utility function of each consumer. 
5. Note that the use of the surplus budget does not affect the quantities of public sector goods 
provided, or the price paid. 
6. This is a feasible and practical compensation scheme. It is used in China after each successive 
"price liberalization" reform. 
7. Proofs of all Propositions are in the Appendix. 
8. They are not substitues, by Assumption 4. 
9. Most notably, the democratization process that accompanied economic reforms in Eastern 
Europe and ex-Soviet Union did not occur in China, where strong government control have 
been maintained in enforcing reform policies. 
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A p p e n d i x  
Proof of Proposition 1 
Substituting S k = (1 + 8k)(1 --"Ck)7C k into T~, we get 
N 
T~ = ~i(Pt-1)- ~oi(Pt) + X; Oij(1 - ~j)(~]-i _ ~p + %ak(1 - ~k)~ , -  Pkq~" 
j = k + l  
Differentiate T~ with respect to Pt '  
N 
OT1--Oq)i(Pt) ~ Oij(1 _ , r j ) ~  + Oik~k(1 _ Xk) ~ ;  ! 
OPt aPt j = k + 1 ~--k k 
OOi(Pt ) 
Since < O, the first term is positive, 
oP t 
Differentiating nli = PjQIj(P) - Cj(Qli(P)) with respect to Pk, we have 
an~j 0Q~j(~t) 
OPk Op t [Pj-MCj(Qlj) ] _< O, 
by Assumption (4), so the second term is also positive. 
Since the profit in sector k can increase or decrease with an increase in the price of product k, 
the sign of ~ is ambiguous. 
On t 0T~ 
(1) If ¢ k ~ -  k --> 0, then we have ~ --- 0. 
0= t 
(2) If ak~pT < 0, however, the exact change in the amount of compensation caused by the 
change in the price of product k depends on the proportion of shares he holds in sector k. 
0T~ 0T~ 
When0_< % ~ A i , w e h a v e ~  -> 0. On the other hand, i f %  > A i , w e h a v e ~  < 0. 
MCj Op t 0T~ 0T~ OP t 
Since Pj = 1 - a- --~ ' it follows that O~k > 0. We know that "~k = aP----~k 0Ct----k- Therefore, 
0T~ 0T~ 
the sign of ~ is the same as the sign of ~ .  QED 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
Since 
0T 
Let T ~- q~(fft-l,o)-~(]fft,o))+ ~ O - c .  First, we want to show that  ~ - O, v¢0, O, if Prob 
k 
{0k_<A } = 1. 
Differentiating T with respect to P~, we get 
0T 00(pt,co) N 0n~ 0n~ 
- OPec E Oi(1 - zj) °ric~ + Okt~k(1 - "Ok) 1¢0p--7. OP~ j = k + l  
From the proof  of Proposit ion 1, we know that  the first two terms are both  positive, while the 
sign of  the third term is ambiguous. 
0x~ OT 
(1) If  a k i n -  k --> 0, then we have ~ >- 0. 
0 ~  3T 
(2) If  ek~--~- k < 0, we need more conditions to decide the sign of ~ .  Let A = 
0~(~t,co) On t. J 
OPt + ]~N= k + 10j( 1 -- xj) OP~ . Note that  there are two kinds of  distributions in A: the index 
0n t 
~k(1 - Zk) 
of utility functions, co, and the proport ion of  shares in the existing private sectors, 0j, j = k + 
1 . . . . .  N. Since $(Pt,c0) is decreasing in P, and strictly increasing in o~, we use to to denote the 
00(~t,to) 
highest absolute value of ~ ,  and ~ to denote its lowest absolute value. Then it follows that  
the lower bound  of  A is 
ao(Pt,~) 
A = OPt 
~k(1 - % ) - - -  
aP t 
0T 
Therefore, if P r o b { 0 k < A  ] = 1, we have .-== _> 0, vco, O. 
0P~ 
Next, we want to show that  Tmi n has a similar property. It follows from the first part  of  the 
proof  that  for any p~t _> p~, if Prob{0k_<A } = 1, we have T '  _> T, vc0, 0. We want  to show that  
Tmi n ~ Tmin, where Tmi n satisfies 
dF(0)n-k+ 1 = d. 
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Suppose not,  then Tmi n < Tmin. Let A = {co E f~ : T '  < Tmin} , and  B = {co E f~: T < Tmin}. 
Since T '  >__ T,  it follows that  A ~_ B. We know that  
It follows that  
Let C = {co E ~ : T '  _< T~nin } . Since Tmin > T~nin, we have C C A. Therefore,  
0Train 
but  this contradicts the definition of  T~i n. So Tml n > Tmi n. Then we have ~ -> 0, and 
0Tmi n - -  0P~¢ 
e q u i v a l e n t l y , -  -> 0. 
Oa k 
Finally, we want to show that  Prob{0 k _< A} = 1 holds in a large population.  
l i:0ik > AI 
P r o b { 0 k < A  } = 1 - P r o b { 0 k < A  } =1 I ' 
1 
Since ~]I= 1 %  = 1, l i :% > AI < min in t [ -~  ], which is bounded and independent of  I. There- 
l i:Oik > fix] 
fore, as I --  + 0% - -  0, we have 
I 
]i:0ik > AI 
Prob{0 k<fix} = 1 ~ =1 .  QED 
P r o o f  o f  Propos i t ion  3 
Differentiating SB* and IB with respect to p t ,  we get 
0SB* OlB N Ont. Ont k _ 1.0Tmi n 
_ _ ~ .-----~J q- Xk'-~'~n t 
OP t OP[ j = k + 1 "rJOPt OPk oPt  
[~ ( m~ 07Lt O~t ~ OTmin ]
..._L + .Ck..g_n_T~ t 
j = k + l  XJaPt O P k /  OPt 
W h e n I - - + o o ,  w e h a v e  T ]~jN-k+l zj~-pT +XkY~-~tOVl¢ ~ 0; also, 
0Train 
follows that  when I - -  + oo, Prob{0k_< A} = 1, and thus ~ - 0. Therefore, - -  - 
- -  0p k 
0IB 0SB* OIB 
- -  -< 0, a n d - -  -<-0. 
3Pt  Oak 3ak 0IB 
Differentiating IB with respect to B k, we get - -  _ 1. 
0B k 
f rom Proposit ion 2, it 
OSB* 
opt 
QED 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
N O~ i N 3Qj #Wt _ ~ ~ aqii 
aPL j = k  i aqiJ aP~ ~ MCi j =k OP[~ 
= ~ ~ [gij-MCil. 
j = k  i 
Proof of Proposition 5 
QED 
Differentiate SB* with respect to d, and apply OTmin/0d _ 0. QED 
